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When are purely predictive models best? 
 
 
Abstract 
Can purely predictive models be useful in investigating causal systems? I argue ‘yes’. 
Moreover, in many cases not only are they useful, they are essential. The alternative is to 
stick to models or mechanisms drawn from well-understood theory. But a necessary 
condition for explanation is empirical success, and in many cases in social and field 
sciences such success can only be achieved by purely predictive models, not by ones 
drawn from theory. Alas, the attempt to use theory to achieve explanation or insight 
without empirical success therefore fails, leaving us with the worst of both worlds – 
neither prediction nor explanation. Best go with empirical success by any means 
necessary. I support these methodological claims via case studies of two impressive feats 
of predictive modelling: opinion polling of political elections, and weather forecasting. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Many areas of science have prioritized the development of theory and mechanisms, with 
the aim of using them to explain messy and hard-to-predict field phenomena. In this 
paper I criticize this widespread methodological approach, arguing that instead we should 
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prioritize empirical success – even though it may be difficult, and even if it means 
foregoing explanation. In the best cases, we can achieve both empirical success and 
explanation. But in frequent other cases we cannot, and then it is better to aim for 
empirical success without explanation than vice versa. Indeed, we have no choice: the 
possibility of achieving explanation without empirical success is an illusion, and 
moreover a harmful one insofar as it diverts effort away from the attempt to achieve 
empirical success. In some of the unpromising cases it does turn out to be possible to 
achieve both empirical success and explanation after all, at least to a degree – but only 
via the route of empirical success first. 
 
In many cases the only route to empirical success is via purely predictive models, i.e. 
models that do not necessarily attempt to capture a situation’s causal structure and thus 
that may not deliver (causal) explanations. In these cases, purely predictive models are 
best. 
 
I support these claims with two case studies of notable predictive success, namely 
forecasting of political elections and of weather. They reinforce the methodological 
lesson that (at least sometimes) predictive success should be prioritized over theory 
development and that, contrary to hopes, theory development cannot provide a shortcut to 
explanation without successful prediction first. After going through the case studies 
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(sections 3-5), I return to the issue of prediction versus explanation and also consider the 
possibility of explanation via historical rather than forward-looking empirical success 
(sections 6-8). 
 
 
2. Prediction versus explanation 
Begin with a simple example familiar from school: a Newtonian model of a cannonball 
dropped from a tower. Using this model, we may predict the acceleration of the ball and, 
thus, the time it takes to reach the ground. These predictions turn out to be very accurate. 
The model is causal: in particular, it describes how the Earth’s gravity causally influences 
the ball’s motion. Thus it gives a causal explanation of the ball’s trajectory. Thus also, it 
is generalizable to many new cases – such as if the ball were a little heavier, or dropped 
from a different tower, or dropped at night rather than during the day.  
 
Such a model is a paradigm case of so-called Galilean idealization: it isolates particular 
causal factors and then uses its analysis of those factors to explain a real-world target, 
even though that target may contain many other factors that the model ignores. Here, the 
Newtonian model idealizes by taking the ball and the Earth to be point masses, air 
resistance to be negligible, and so on. Taken literally, it is therefore false. Yet, as many 
philosophers of science have argued, idealized and therefore false models can 
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nevertheless be explanatory. We do not need to go into the details of why; roughly, they 
all come down to the same verdict: idealized models can be explanatory when their 
falsity does not matter, i.e. when the idealizations are true enough for, say, predictive 
accuracy.
1
 In our Newtonian case, the key vindicating feature is the accuracy of the 
model’s predictions – it is this that gives warrant to its causal representation and thus to 
its causal explanations. It is also what gives warrant to the model’s generalization to new 
contexts, since the causal structure it identifies is presumed to extrapolate. Whether the 
model will remain predictively accurate in a new context is then a matter of whether that 
context features significant other, disturbing causes unrepresented by the model. But even 
if for this reason it is no longer predictively accurate, nevertheless we may still have 
warrant to accept that the model truly identifies some of the causes present – if we have 
reason to think that the modeled causes continue to operate even in the presence of the 
unmodeled ones. 
 
But this is the easy case, philosophically speaking: a causal model with empirical 
success, and which therefore offers both explanation and generalization. It is true that 
there are many such easy cases. But it is also true that there are many difficult ones. In 
particular, predictive success is often elusive. Indeed, this is arguably typically so in 
                                                 
1
 See, for instance, work by Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Hausman, Uskali Mäki, Michael Strevens, and 
Michael Weisberg. For an overview, see Weisberg (2013). 
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social sciences and in field sciences more generally.
2
 What should we do then? This is 
where there is a great methodological split. 
 
One common response, from philosophers and scientists alike, is that, roughly speaking, 
we should give priority to explanation over prediction. A long tradition, for instance, has 
doubted that systematic predictive success (or empirical success generally) in social 
science is possible. Among the reasons offered why not are: that social systems are open, 
i.e. are chronically subject to significant influences from non-social factors that are 
inevitably unmodeled by social science; that social systems exhibit reflexivity, i.e. that 
models themselves may influence their subject matter, thus creating a moving target; or 
simply that typically there are too many variables needing to be modeled (Taylor 1971, 
Giddens 1976, Hacking 1995, Lawson 1997). This pessimism has been bolstered by the 
great difficulty in practice of achieving predictive success. Thus, for instance, it has 
proved notoriously difficult to forecast what GDP or the unemployment rate will be in 12 
months, who will win an election in six months, or (to cite a field but not social science) 
what the weather will be in one month. 
 
In the face of this apparent impossibility, or at least great difficulty, of prediction, it has 
been argued that the goal of science should change: instead of prediction, it should 
                                                 
2
 By ‘field sciences’ I mean non-laboratory investigations of systems that are not engineered artefacts. 
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instead be explanation. And the route to such explanation is the development of theory. 
Even in the absence of predictive success, it is held, such an approach offers the promise 
of understanding and insight. Indeed, such an achievement is often thought to be superior 
to mere predictive success, even when the latter is possible. The reason is that predictive 
success (or empirical success generally) in any particular case may require account to be 
taken of all factors, no matter how transient or sui generis. But what is of greater interest 
is those factors or theoretical structures that generalize. It is the task of science, as a 
pursuit of systematic knowledge, to discover and isolate the latter. In the case of 
economics, for instance, we might be interested in a particular structure of choices and 
incentives, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, because we understand this structure, and the 
outcomes to be expected from it, in terms of the discipline’s fundamental building block 
of constrained agent rational choice, and because we think this structure crops up in many 
different places. Therefore, rather than get lost in local details it is more fruitful to focus 
on the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure – even though it may predict accurately in hardly 
any particular cases. The analogy is with the methodological role of mechanisms in other 
sciences, such as neuroscience. Explanation in neuroscience, many philosophers have 
persuasively argued, is via appeal to mechanisms that, analogously to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, are well understood and generalizable (Machamer et al 2000 and many others). 
Accordingly, just as in neuroscience, it is knowledge of mechanisms that enables true 
explanation and understanding in social science and field sciences generally, and our 
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emphasis should be on that. It is knowledge of mechanisms, and the theory that 
underwrites it, that provides the understanding of any empirical success that we might 
achieve – and also provides understanding even in the many cases when our empirical 
success is imperfect.
3
 Or so the argument goes. 
 
Accordingly, there has been much philosophical support for the view that development of 
theory and mechanisms, rather than empirical or predictive accuracy, should be the 
primary goal of social science (Lawson 1997, Brante 2001, Elster 1989, Little 1991).
4
 
More than that, implicitly there has been much support too for this view from scientists 
themselves. The practice of economics, for instance, has been to develop a suite of formal 
models and then to apply these models as best we can to particular real-world targets, 
even knowing that rarely will they be fully accurate predictively. Usually, at least 
implicitly, such models are given a causal interpretation.
5
 
 
So that is one response to the difficulty of prediction. Now turn to a contrary response – 
one that rejects a methodological emphasis on mechanisms and underlying theory 
                                                 
3
 There is a literature on whether ‘understanding’, ‘insight’ and the like have any epistemic value over and 
above explanation, but I will not address that here. I also do not commit myself to any particular definition 
of ‘mechanism’. 
4
 W. G. Runciman: “The proper function of a social science … is not prediction but diagnosis.” (1963, 17). 
5
 Rodrik (2015) is a recent – and widely admired – articulation of this typical economist view. 
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(Cartwright 2007, Reiss 2008). One strand, motivated in part by detailed case studies of 
other empirical successes, has emphasized instead context-specific and extra-theoretical 
work. Theories and mechanisms play at most a heuristic role (Alexandrova 2008, 
Alexandrova and Northcott 2009). 
 
In this paper I will investigate a more specific version of this alternative to the mechanist 
program. It advocates, roughly speaking, prioritizing prediction over explanation.
6
 
According to it, we should concentrate on achieving predictive success even if that means 
abandoning or moving beyond established theoretical models. This therefore offers the 
opposite methodological advice to that of the mechanists, and so in many cases implies a 
critique of scientific practice. The chief drawback of this alternative approach is that, 
because there may be no causal model underpinning a successful prediction, so we cannot 
offer any explanation of the predictive successes that we do achieve. Nor can we easily 
generalize from them in order to achieve predictive success in other cases too, including 
using them to assess hypothetical or counterfactual cases. 
 
In this paper, I will examine two examples of field phenomena that are highly complex 
but that have nevertheless been predicted successfully: political elections, and the 
                                                 
6
 Of course, in practice prediction and explanation inform each other and are often closely related (Douglas 
2009). Indeed, I will return to their relation later. Nevertheless, there remains a distinct methodological 
split. 
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weather. After looking at the methods used to achieve these successes, the lesson I will 
draw from them is that, contrary to the mechanistic view, the second methodological 
option above is preferable. That is, despite the difficulty of achieving accurate prediction, 
we should indeed prioritize it over explanation. Moreover, paradoxically, in the difficult 
cases this priority for prediction also turns out to be the only way to get explanations too. 
After that, I will then discuss the extent to which these conclusions generalize beyond the 
two examples. 
 
 
3. Election prediction 1: polling aggregation 
Successful election predictions are based on opinion polling, and the most successful 
predictors of all have been some aggregators of polling results. Take the 2012 US 
presidential election, in which Barack Obama defeated Mitt Romney. This campaign 
featured literally thousands of opinion polls. Famously, several aggregators correctly 
predicted the winner of all 51 states, as well as also getting Obama’s national vote share 
correct to within a few tenths of a percent.
7
 This is a stunning success, arguably with few 
                                                 
7
 Four of the most successful aggregators were: http://votamatic.org, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/pollster/, http://election.princeton.edu/, and 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/. The forecasting models for the first two of these were designed 
mainly by political science academics, the third by a neuroscience academic, and the last by a 
non-academic. Three of the four got every state right. Note: these predictions were from immediately 
beforehand; accuracy diminishes the further in advance of an election they are made. 
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equals in social science. Nor was it easy.
8
 On the morning of the election Romney’s odds 
at the bookmakers were 9/2, i.e. about 18%. Political futures markets such as InTrade put 
Romney’s chances at about 28%. These market prices imply that common opinion was 
surprised by the outcome.
9
 
 
This success was not a fluke: the same poll aggregators have been successful in other 
elections too. And within any one election there have been many separate successful 
predictions, such as of individual Senate races or of margins of victory, which are at least 
partially independent of each other. Moreover, the aggregators’ methods are 
independently persuasive. 
 
                                                 
8
 See 
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/war-on-nate-silver-final-after-action-report-the-flag-of-science-flies
-uncontested-over-silvergrad-weblogging.html for a list of 47 examples of failure, with an emphasis on 
their suspicion of polling-based prediction. 
9
 There is an issue here about how we measure success in the case of probabilistic predictions. After all, 
these market prices still made Obama favorite, so why should we term them ‘surprised’ by his victory? In 
reply, besides the simple fact of the overall winner, there were also relevant additional facts: who won each 
state; and how much they won them by. Odds-makers were not impressive with respect to these more 
detailed targets. Indeed, barring unlikely background assumptions, the details of the state-level results are 
hard to reconcile with a 28% chance of overall Romney victory. There is no serious dispute that the 
odds-makers and many other predictors were not accurate. On the further matter of which poll aggregator 
did best, see: http://rationality.org/2012/11/09/was-nate-silver-the-most-accurate-2012-election-pundit/. 
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The predictions here were the result of two distinct stages: first, opinion polling itself; 
then second, aggregation of individual polls. Begin with the former. In any opinion poll, 
the voting intentions of a sample serve as a proxy for those of a population. How might 
things go wrong, such that the sample will not be representative? The most well-known 
way is random sampling error: small samples can lead to misleading flukes. The larger 
the sample, the less this is a problem. But more important are various forms of sampling 
bias, i.e. of systematic sampling errors that (for a given sampling procedure) cannot be 
alleviated simply by increasing sample size.
10
 Awareness of this crucial point lies at the 
heart of any serious election prediction. I’ll illustrate here with an especially notable 
source of sampling bias, namely balancing for demographic factors.
11
  
 
Suppose, for example, that three-quarters of interviewees were women. Since there is 
good reason to think that women were disproportionately likely to vote for Obama, it 
follows that such a woman-heavy sample would give misleadingly pro-Obama 
predictions. This problem cannot be alleviated just by making the sample larger.
 
Polling 
                                                 
10
 Lying in the background here are reference class issues. But given the unavoidable cognitive and 
epistemic constraints facing polling scientists, their choice of reference class is not arbitrary. And in 
practice the distinction between random and systematic sampling error is vital. Evidence of the latter’s 
importance: almost 25% even of late polls miss the final election result by more than their official 
confidence interval, yet the expected miss rate given random sampling error alone should be only 5%. 
(http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-fivethirtyeight-senate-forecast-model-works/) 
11
 Northcott (2015) briefly discusses some further sources. 
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companies would therefore rebalance such a sample, in effect putting greater weight on 
men’s responses. Such rebalancing is unavoidable if we wish to predict accurately, and 
every polling company performs some version of it. Any poll’s headline figures are 
therefore heavily constructed. They are certainly not the raw survey results.  
 
Exactly what rebalancing is required depends on assumptions about electoral turnout. For 
instance, in recent American presidential elections typically there have been slightly 
fewer men than women voters, so it would be a mistake to rebalance the sample to 
exactly 50-50. The exact figure may not be obvious, it needing to be inferred from 
imperfect data about past elections, and moreover with some assessment of how patterns 
of turnout might change again in the upcoming election. Accordingly, different polling 
companies may reasonably choose slightly different rebalancing procedures. The result is 
the phenomenon of ‘house effects’, i.e. when a particular company’s results 
systematically favor one or other candidate compared to the industry average. When 
assessing the significance of a poll for election prediction, it is vital to be aware of this. 
 
The rebalancing issue is pressing because it applies to many other factors besides gender, 
such as: age; income; race; likeliness to vote; education; ownership of cellphones but not 
landlines; and home access to internet. Not only is the precise rebalancing procedure for 
each of these factors arguable, it is also arguable exactly which factors should be 
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rebalanced for in the first place (Northcott 2015). 
 
Turn now to the aggregation of polls, which represents a second layer of method quite 
distinct from that required to conduct a single poll. Historically, poll aggregation has had 
a better predictive record than using individual polls alone. One obvious reason why is 
that aggregation increases effective sample size and therefore reduces random sampling 
error. But it is not just that; it is also that sophisticated aggregation can mitigate the other 
sources of error too. This explains why the best aggregators beat simple averaging of the 
polls. Some polls are worthy of greater epistemic weight than others. Unless election day 
is very close, demographic factors can improve on the predictions of polls alone. 
Historical evidence can inform how much regression to the mean to expect if one 
candidate is unexpectedly far ahead, or if they have received a polling bounce from their 
party’s convention. Some crucial issues during the 2012 campaign required such 
sophisticated analysis. Two prominent examples were: first, a persistent disagreement 
between state-level and national-level polling; and second, whether the polls might be 
wrong due to being systematically skewed against Romney. Neither of these issues could 
be addressed simply by taking a polling average, yet each was crucial to accurate 
prediction.
12
 In sum, polling aggregation is a skillful matter, which is why only a few 
managed it successfully. 
                                                 
12
 See Northcott (2015) for detailed discussion. 
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4. Election prediction 2: fundamentals modelling 
There is an alternative approach to election prediction, and one that corresponds to the 
mechanistic strategy that prioritizes explanation over prediction. In particular, a literature 
in political science focuses on ‘fundamentals’, i.e. on variables that might be relevant to 
elections in general and not just to particular cases. These variables include economic 
conditions, the perceived extremism of candidates, incumbency, and so forth.
13
 How 
does this literature fare? 
 
Conveniently, it too has focused on US presidential elections. The sample size is 
relatively small, as fewer than 20 have good enough data. This creates a danger of 
overfitting. In response, models have typically featured only a small number of variables, 
most commonly economic ones such as growth in GDP, jobs or real incomes.
14
 They are 
estimated on the basis of one part of the sample and then tested by tracking their 
                                                 
13
 Influential contributions include Fair (1978), Campbell and Wink (1990), Hibbs (2000), Abramowitz 
(2008), and Lewis-Beck and Tien (2008). Montgomery et al (2012) averages these and other models to 
achieve the best forecasting success of all. 
14
 Literally thousands of economic variables could plausibly be deemed relevant, not to mention many 
non-economic ones too. The risk of overfitting is one good reason to prioritize prediction over retrospective 
accommodation here. There is a long established literature in philosophy of science on the relative 
epistemic merits generally of prediction versus accommodation, but I will not discuss that here. 
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predictive performance with respect to the rest of the sample. Even then, there remains a 
risk of overfitting: if a model predicted the first few out-of-sample elections quite well, 
will its success continue in future elections? Moreover, even if a model does successfully 
predict past elections, there is no guarantee the political environment is so stable that the 
model will remain correct in future too. 
 
These caveats noted, it is true that the models can show some predictive success. On one 
estimate, the best ones’ average error when predicting the incumbent party’s share of the 
vote is between 2 and 3%.
15
 But this is not quite as impressive as it might sound: first, 
for our purposes it is something of a cheat, in that one of the variables in by far the 
highest weighted model – Abramowitz 2008 – is a polling result, namely presidential 
approval rating. So the success is not achieved purely by fundamentals. Second, a 2-3% 
average error corresponds to an average error when estimating the gap between the 
leading two candidates of about 5%. And third, vote shares rarely deviate all that much 
from 50% anyway, so they are quite an easy target – indeed, another estimate is that 
economic variables account for only about 30-40% of the variance in incumbent party 
vote share.
16
 Overall, the models do not predict individual election results very reliably. 
                                                 
15
 See http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2011/11/a-comparison-of-presidential-forecasting-models.html 
for discussion and references. 
16
 http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-radical-centrist-view-on-election-forecasting/ 
  
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On many occasions they even get wrong the crude fact of which candidate won. For 
accurate prediction, it is necessary to incorporate the results of opinion polls. 
 
Still, a primary motivation of the fundamentals literature, in keeping with the mechanistic 
strategy generally, is to be able to provide explanations. Can we establish why Obama 
won? But unfortunately the fundamentals approach fails on this score too. 
 
On the polling side, in a trivial sense Obama’s victory is ‘explained’ by the fact that, as 
revealed by aggregators, on the eve of the election a majority of the electorate were 
minded to vote for him. But, of course, for most investigative purposes a deeper 
explanation is required. Polling aggregation provides none. 
 
On the fundamentals side, if its models had fared better they would have provided the 
very explanations that polling aggregation does not. After all, that is precisely the 
motivation for theory-centered methodology. Thus we might have been able to explain 
that Obama won because of, say, positive GDP and jobs statistics in the preceding two 
quarters. Unfortunately, though, the fundamentals models are not predictively accurate. 
And to explain requires identification of an event’s causes, which requires a verified 
theory or causal model, which in turn requires empirical warrant.
17
 
                                                 
17
 Following the literatures under consideration here, I focus on causal explanation. I do not mean to rule 
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Can the fundamentals models nevertheless provide us with explanations anyway? The 
argument would be that they have truly identified relevant causes. It might be postulated, 
for instance, that GDP or stock market growth does causally impact on voter preferences 
and thus on election outcomes. True, other causes impact too and so the models do not 
explain the outcomes fully nor predict them accurately, but that still leaves room for the 
claim that they explain them ‘partially’ by correctly identifying some of the causes 
present.
18
 
 
But, alas, even this weaker claim is dubious here. First, the different models cite different 
variables. Abramowitz’s, for instance, cites GDP growth, presidential approval rating, 
and a complex treatment of incumbency; Hibbs’s though cites growth in real disposable 
income and the number of military fatalities abroad. Even among economic variables 
alone, some models cite GDP, some household incomes, some jobs data, some stock 
market performance, and so on, each with different combinations of lags. At heart, there 
are many different ways to achieve roughly the same limited predictive success, which 
shakes our faith that any one way has isolated the true causal drivers of election results. 
Perhaps the small sample size relative to the number of plausible variables makes this 
                                                                                                                                                 
out the possibility of other forms of explanation. 
18
 See Northcott (2012) and Northcott (2013) for more on the relevant sense of partial explanation. 
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problem insoluble. 
 
A second reason for pessimism is that, elsewhere in science, a standard response to such 
predictive failure is to test putative causes in isolation. As it were, at least we achieve 
predictive success in the isolated test. But unfortunately such experiments are impossible 
in the case of election predictions. So as well as predictive failure at the level of elections 
as a whole, the causal factors picked out by the models have not earned their empirical 
keep by any other means either. 
 
The upshot is that we have no warrant even for partial causes of election outcomes, and 
therefore no warrant even for partial explanations. Thus the basic conclusion stands: we 
have not achieved any explanation of election outcomes, and so the original motivation 
for turning to fundamentals models is frustrated. 
 
 
5. Weather forecasting 
On the face of it, the Earth’s weather might seem an unlikely object of predictive success. 
It has long been thought a chaotic system, in other words that outcomes are indefinitely 
sensitive to exact initial conditions (Lorenz 1969). More recently, it has also been 
convincingly argued that weather predictions are (often) also indefinitely sensitive to 
  
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
model errors – that is, even tiny inaccuracies in a model can lead to very large errors in 
the predictions made by that model (Frigg et al 2014). These are obviously major 
challenges for prediction. Yet, despite them, weather forecasting accuracy has improved 
significantly over recent decades.
19
 Hurricane paths are predicted more accurately and 
further ahead, and temperature and rainfall predictions are more accurate too. Overall, the 
reliability of seven-day forecasts now is equal to that of three-day forecasts 20 years ago 
(Bechtold et al 2012).
20
 What explains this tremendous progress? 
 
There are several factors. One is the huge improvement in the quality and quantity of 
weather data, stemming initially from the launch of the first weather satellites in the 
1960s. There are now temperature, humidity and other reports of ever greater refinement 
both horizontally (currently increments of 20km squares) and vertically (currently 91 
separate altitude layers). Over 10 million observations per day are inputted into the 
ECMWF’s calculations. A second source of progress has been the huge increase in 
available computing power. This has enabled ever more complex models to be used, ever 
more simulations to be run, and thus the huge improvements in the available data to be 
properly exploited. A third source of progress has been in the models of the weather 
themselves, which are used to make the predictions (see shortly). Finally, a fourth source 
                                                 
19
 Throughout, I will use the terms ‘prediction’ and ‘forecast’ interchangeably. 
20
 I will concentrate on the work of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), 
but similar remarks apply to other weather forecasters too. 
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has been improvement in analytical methods. Perhaps the most significant of these 
followed on from the introduction of stochastic terms in the basic model in the late 
1990s: this allowed an ensemble method of forecasting to be adopted.
21
 Multiple 
simulations are run – in the case of the ECMWF, currently about 50.22 These are then 
used to generate probabilistic forecasts.
23
 
 
The use of the ensemble method is particularly significant because it is the main way in 
which forecasters have overcome the problem of chaos. In particular, although any one 
forecast inevitably risks going seriously askew because of an arbitrarily small error in the 
inputted initial conditions, it has been found from experience that, as in many chaotic 
systems, these errors ‘cancel out’ over many iterations. That is, the errors are not 
systematically in one particular direction, and so the probabilistic forecasts derived from 
an ensemble of forecasts are not biased. 
 
                                                 
21
 Other analytical innovations include new forms of bias correction, which account for fluctuations in 
instrument calibration and enhance consistency between diverse types of observation – for instance, data 
from all of satellites, sea buoys, and conventional ground stations. Another important component is the 
balance struck between observation and background errors. These errors exhibit significant variations 
between observation types and locations. The balance struck between them determines the weight given to 
observations in the analysis (Bechtold et al 2012). 
22
 The variety on which the ensemble works is generated not just by the model uncertainty introduced by 
stochastic terms in the model, but also by data uncertainty. 
23
 A similar ensemble method is also used by leading polling aggregators. 
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These sources of progress have interacted with each other. For instance, the increase in 
data and computing power have enabled the development of more sophisticated models, 
the exploitation of which is constrained by the need to run the required number of 
simulations quickly enough to generate timely forecasts. Indeed the ensemble method of 
forecasting, notwithstanding its desirability, was simply not feasible until sufficient 
computing power became available. Meanwhile the needs of the model, and in particular 
knowledge from experience of what data improvements would most improve the 
accuracy of the model’s predictions, in turn influence the gathering of data, such as the 
choice of instruments to be included on new satellites. 
 
Turn now in more detail to the remaining source of progress, namely the improvements 
in the weather model itself.
24
 At the heart of these models are differential equations that 
have been known for hundreds of years, namely Newton’s laws of fluid dynamics. These 
are assumed to govern the fiendishly complex movements of air in the atmosphere, and 
how those are impacted by temperature, pressure, the Earth’s rotation, the cycle of night 
and day, and so on. So far as is known, this ‘fundamental’ theory remains a true 
description of the weather system (or at least as approximately true as any other 
Newtonian model). However, as we will see, in practice it is not sufficient to generate 
                                                 
24
 Much of the following is taken from the discussions of the ECMWF model in (Bechtold et al 2008) and 
(Jung et al 2010), as well as from personal communication with Roberto Buizza, Head of the Predictability 
Division at ECMWF. 
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accurate weather forecasts. Moreover, refining the model from first principles has not 
proved to be an effective way to improve this situation. Rather, a whole series of 
additions have had to be made to the model that reflect various sui generis factors. More 
to the point, the exact form that these additions should take is under-determined by 
fundamental theory. Instead, many different forms have been tried, and the ones adopted 
have been determined by a trial-and-error process. In particular, the huge amount of 
weather data now becomes an important epistemic advantage because it is possible to test 
various tweaks on a vast archive of past data, as well as to test which tweak predicts best 
on new data. In this respect, the weather forecasters have it much easier than the election 
predictors, who were restricted to just 20 or so data points of past presidential elections. 
 
There is a cost to this method though, familiar already from the elections case – although 
these changes to the model have greatly improved predictive accuracy, they have come at 
the cost of explanatory transparency. The reason is the usual one for purely predictive 
models, namely the deviation from well-established theoretical underpinnings. The 
various tweaks mean that there is no longer a warranted causal interpretation for each 
term in the model. Mathematically, the main differential equations now feature an extra 
term, not derived from theory, to represent new factors. The point is that the forms of 
these extra terms are not given by theory; rather, they are determined empirically, i.e. by 
whichever form gives the best predictive results. The same is true of deciding whether a 
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particular factor should be incorporated into the model at all – sometimes, such as with 
ocean coupling (see shortly), theoretically well-motivated and initially promising 
innovations have eventually been dropped because they did not pay their way 
predictively. 
 
In order to predict successfully, weather modelers must be aware of a huge range of 
detailed meteorological factors over and above the basic laws of fluid dynamics. Here are 
a couple of examples for illustration. First, consider mountains. These are well known to 
influence atmospheric circulation and to have large local effects on air flow and 
precipitation, both around mountains themselves and in surrounding areas. So it was 
realized in the early 2000s that introducing a term for the effect of mountains could 
potentially improve the model. The question was how exactly to do this. To work that 
out, it was necessary to move beyond theory: 
 
“[One version of the model] included a ‘cutoff’ or ‘effective’ mountain height in the 
computation of gravity wave drag from the SSO scheme [i.e. the scheme to represent 
mountains]. The more physically realistic cutoff mountain height resulted in a decrease in 
gravity wave drag (GWD), reducing the excessive deceleration of flow over the 
Himalayas and Rocky Mountains ... However, climate runs showed an increase in the 
positive zonal wind bias over winter northern hemisphere mid-latitudes, suggesting that 
the reduction in GWD had been excessive. This problem was solved [in the next version 
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of the model] by doubling the ‘cutoff’ mountain height and thereby increasing the 
amplitude of the gravity waves ‘generated’ by the SSO scheme by a factor of two.” (Jung 
et al 2010, 9)
25
 
 
Notice the sequence here: the less physically realistic formulation was the one eventually 
adopted, because it generated more accurate forecasts. That is, predictive fit trumped 
causal understanding. Instead, the role of causal understanding was a heuristic one – to 
suggest factors to be considered, in this case the impact on air flows of mountains. 
Exactly how those factors were best incorporated could not be derived from theory but 
instead was determined, in instrumentalist style, by brute predictive efficacy. 
 
It is a similar story when considering whether a factor should be incorporated at all. 
Again, theory suggests – but prediction decides. Consider ‘ocean coupling’. This refers, 
roughly speaking, to the way in which the ocean and atmosphere work together to 
transfer heat from the tropics to polar regions and also to influence the circulation of 
fresh and salt water. Key elements are the exchange of heat between sea and atmosphere, 
and the impact of ocean currents. Naturally, weather modelers sought to incorporate these 
apparently significant processes. But it was found that “results from climate simulations 
[that incorporated ocean coupling] are similar but slightly ‘worse’ with respect to 
                                                 
25
 The page references here and elsewhere in this section are to the versions of the papers published as 
ECMWF Technical Reports. 
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observations compared to the uncoupled simulations. Therefore, only results from the 
uncoupled simulations are shown” (Bechtold et al 2012, 22).26 That is, a theoretical 
improvement was rejected on empirical grounds. This is the opposite of the mechanists’ 
methodological recommendation; priority was given instead to improving predictive 
accuracy. 
 
This pattern is general. For instance, another factor suggested by theory, which is being 
investigated at the moment, is the role of sea ice. But exactly how this should be 
incorporated into the model, or even whether it should be incorporated at all, will be 
determined entirely by empirical considerations. Similar remarks apply to many other 
features, such as vertical diffusion, soil hydrology, clouds, vegetation, and ocean waves. 
 
So the notable progress in weather forecasting over recent decades has not come from 
any improvement in fundamental theory, i.e. Newton’s fluid dynamics, which indeed 
remains unchanged. Rather, it has been driven by relentlessly prioritizing predictive 
success even at the expense of explanatory transparency. The commercial imperative to 
generate accurate forecasts above all else, has focused minds methodologically. 
 
                                                 
26
 Weather forecasters often refer to their models as ‘climate’ simulations. Nevertheless their focus is 
strictly on predicting weather, not on the long-term processes that are the focus of climate science. 
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Return now to the issue of model error – the second great conceptual challenge to 
weather forecasting noted earlier. Recall: even minuscule errors in a model can lead to 
quickly escalating errors in that model’s predictions. So how can this danger be averted, 
given that weather forecasters’ current models are clearly not literally true and therefore 
are in error in the relevant sense? A purely theoretical solution is unavailable. The answer 
instead is a further advertisement for brute emphasis on predictive accuracy above all 
else. Simply put, many different versions of a model, including different stochastic 
adjustments, are tested against the empirical data. The ones selected are those that, as a 
matter of fact, predict the best. This method has proven effective at avoiding the problem 
of model error – simply pick those models whose errors of representation turn out not to 
lead to errors of prediction. 
 
An important methodological feature in weather forecasting is the holistic nature of its 
empirical testing. Particular tweaks are made to a model, and these are then tested by 
checking the model’s overall predictive success. The reason is the presumed ubiquity of 
interactive effects: a tweak to the model might have one effect now, but then a very 
different effect (or no effect) once other parts of the model are altered. Experience has 
suggested that such instability of effect is common. “It is very difficult to understand how 
exactly changes in model formulation affect the climate of the model” (Jung et al 2010, 
13). As a result, in practice it is impossible reliably to predict what the impact will be of a 
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particular tweak – the Galilean method breaks down. Rather, only testing can reveal the 
answer in any particular case. 
 
This militates against causal inference, and so it is much more difficult for the weather 
forecasting models to give explanations than it is for them to give predictions. In this 
respect, their situation resembles that of the polling aggregators. (It also resembles that of 
the designers of some economic auctions – Alexandrova and Northcott 2009.) A (causal) 
explanation requires the claim that things would have been different if a particular factor 
had been different; but holistic prediction cannot license such detailed counterfactual 
claims. 
 
In the weather case though, more so than in the election or auction cases, it seems there 
might be some partial exceptions to this ‘no explanations’ conclusion. At root, what 
makes these possible is the exceptional quantity of data available. I mention only one of 
these exceptions briefly here (taken from Jung et al 2010; see that paper and also 
Bechtold et al 2008 for more details and examples): there have been extensive recent 
changes to the model’s treatment of convection schemes in the tropics and to its treatment 
of the radiative properties of ice clouds. These changes have of course been thoroughly 
tested for their impact on predictive success and refined accordingly. But in addition, the 
data allowed modelers to test whether the two changes composed non-linearly or not. In 
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this case, it was found that the non-linear – i.e. interactive – effects were relatively small. 
Accordingly, particular improvements in overall predictions now could justifiably be 
attributed to particular changes to the model. (I return to this issue in section 8 below.) 
 
 
6. Prediction versus explanation revisited 
Consider the following schematic table: 
 
 
 Explanation No explanation 
Successful prediction Slot 1: Newtonian 
cannonball 
Slot 2: polling aggregation, weather 
forecasting 
Unsuccessful prediction Slot 3: (Empty) Slot 4: fundamentals election 
prediction, much actual social science? 
 
 
In Slot 1 in the table are the happy cases where we achieve the best of both worlds, such 
as when a causal model predicts accurately and thereby also causally explains. Classic 
cases of Galilean idealization, such as the Newtonian cannonball, fall into this category. 
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In Slot 2 are cases where we achieve predictive success, but only ‘purely predictive’ 
success – i.e. when the methods and models required to achieve predictive success are 
such that they do not yield generalizable explanations. Examples discussed in this paper 
are polling aggregation and weather forecasting. 
 
In Slot 4 are cases where we get the worst of both worlds, i.e. no prediction and no 
explanation either. The ‘fundamentals’ election models fall into this category: they offer 
causal models, but their lack of empirical success means we have no warrant for them. 
Moreover, given the practical impossibility of testing the individual causes in isolation, it 
is not possible to gain warrant even for the claim that they explain partially. 
 
In Slot 3 are cases of explanation without prediction. None of our examples fits this 
description. I will argue now that that is no coincidence – this slot remains empty 
generally. The reason is that, according to all prevailing theories of explanation in 
philosophy of science, explanatory success requires empirical success. In particular, 
causal explanation requires true (or approximately true) identification of causes present. 
What can be the warrant for such identification? In science, it must be empirical success. 
The most convincing proof of such success in turn is successful prediction – or at least it 
is in cases where there exist many competing models and much scope for after-the-fact 
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rationalization, which covers many cases of claimed ‘empirical success’ in social science 
(Northcott and Alexandrova 2015) and arguably in field sciences too. 
 
Admittedly, there are two important caveats here. First, in other cases it may be that 
explanations can also gain warrant from empirical success achieved retrospectively 
(section 7). In those cases, Slot 3 is only empty if we understand ‘unsuccessful 
prediction’ broadly as referring not only to forward-looking prediction but also to 
after-the-fact ‘retrodiction’ too. 
 
Second, care should be taken in interpreting ‘unsuccessful prediction’ in another way as 
well. Sometimes a model may not predict accurately because of the influence of 
unmodeled disturbing causes, yet it may nevertheless still have truly identified some of 
the causes present, thus achieving partial explanation. But in such cases we still must 
have warrant for thinking that these causes are truly identified, and if that warrant doesn’t 
come from successful prediction in the case at hand then it must come from somewhere 
else. In experimental sciences, controlled experiments elsewhere give us the needed 
warrant to believe that particular causes or mechanisms are present and behaving in the 
way our models suggest. But in social and field sciences, such warrant is frequently 
absent.
27
 That leaves us with no successful predictions of any sort, either of the situation 
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 To be sure, in recent decades there has been a growth industry of controlled experiments in economics 
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at hand or of other relevant cases. This was precisely the problem with the fundamentals 
models of election prediction, and it leaves us stuck in Slot 4 with neither prediction nor 
explanation.
28
 Thus, if ‘prediction’ is interpreted broadly to mean ‘prediction 
somewhere’ (i.e. to include relevant testing of proposed mechanisms by experiments in 
contexts other than the present one), then Slot 3 is necessarily empty. No empirical 
success, no explanation. 
 
In this light, what can the method of Galilean idealization, or of prioritizing mechanistic 
explanation over mere prediction (understood broadly as per the above), achieve? The 
answer is: a place in either Slot 1 or Slot 4, i.e. either both of prediction and explanation 
or neither of them. In the happy cases where predictive success is achieved, that means 
Slot 1, and all is fine. But when predictive success is not achieved, that means Slot 4. Yet 
Slot 4 is obviously inferior to Slot 2, which at least offers prediction even if still no 
explanation. The real problem is the misguided belief that, by focusing on theory and 
mechanisms, we can at least ensure that we reach Slot 3 even if we don’t achieve Slot 1, 
i.e. that we can at least achieve explanation even without empirical success. But this is to 
put the cart before the horse, and is how the idea that models can be explanatory without 
                                                                                                                                                 
and other fields. In principle, these might provide just the needed empirical warrant. In practice though, the 
problem of external validity has often hindered that (Northcott and Alexandrova 2015). 
28
 Arguably, this problem is widespread. For an argument to this effect with respect to economics, see 
(Northcott and Alexandrova 2013). 
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empirical success can become a harmful illusion. In a mistaken pursuit of Slot 3, we 
condemn ourselves to Slot 4 even though Slot 2 may still be achievable. That is, in 
fruitlessly pursuing explanation without prediction, we unnecessarily forego what may 
actually be achievable, namely prediction without explanation. 
 
In sum, empirically successful models are always best, and whatever modelling strategy 
yields them is the one we have to follow. And when are purely predictive models best? 
Answer: when otherwise empirical success (and thus explanation) is unobtainable. 
Something is better than nothing. 
 
 
7. Historical explanation
29
 
If we understand prediction narrowly to refer only to claims about future events then 
explanation is possible without it – because, as mentioned, sometimes it can be achieved 
by historical analysis too. Even if I failed to predict beforehand that I would win my 
tennis match, say, still I might successfully be able to explain my win afterwards by 
noting that my opponent got injured halfway through. 
 
                                                 
29
 I thank the editors and an anonymous referee for pressing me on the issues in this section. 
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In response, note again that empirical success is still necessary for explanation. In 
particular, in the case of causal explanation, true identification of a relevant cause is 
necessary – if my opponent had not got injured, and if that injury had not caused their 
defeat, my explanation would have been incorrect. 
 
Whether the empirical success is via predictions before the fact or via historical analysis 
after it, the interesting issue, methodologically speaking, remains: how do we achieve 
such success? Return to our two case studies, beginning with elections. How might we 
explain election results after the fact? Not by appeal to the fundamentals models, for the 
reason pointed out earlier: there is no warrant for claiming they have truly identified even 
some of the causes of election outcomes. An alternative is after-the-fact questionnaires, 
when voters are asked why they voted as they did. These are certainly potentially good 
evidence for explanations of an election result, although they do come with a couple of 
caveats: first, people’s answers to such questionnaires are often unreliable. (Indeed, 
questionnaire answers as a group are inconsistent even with recorded vote totals, never 
mind the reasons for those vote totals.) Second, so far at least, explanations drawn from 
such questionnaires have lacked generalizability: no one has been able to construct from 
them a model with significant predictive power for elections in general, as opposed to 
constructing after-the-fact explanations, varying each time, for particular results. 
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Another approach is to use demographics. In the context of American presidential 
elections, the ambition is to explain election outcomes in particular states (and nationally) 
by reference to those states’ population profiles with respect to ethnicity, wealth, levels of 
education, and so on. As mentioned, such demographic variables do add predictive value 
several months ahead of time, although polls dominate them by the time of the election 
date itself. But can demographic models help with explanation? To a degree, yes – and 
that degree is precisely the degree to which their empirical success can be established. 
For example, comparing election results in different American states in effect offers the 
possibility of a natural experiment. With due care, it can therefore be established that, 
say, the different percentage of black Democratic voters in Wisconsin and South Carolina 
explains a certain amount of the difference in Clinton’s vote share in those two states 
during her 2016 primary campaign against Sanders.
30
 
 
In the weather forecasting example, by contrast, it is hard to see any generalizable 
explanations beyond those limited ones inferable from the forecasting models (section 8 
below). 
 
                                                 
30
 Note that this would yield only a partial explanation of the primary results, since it identifies only one 
cause of them. Moreover the explanation is a little imprecise, both because the definition of a ‘black’ voter 
is imprecise and because the impact of ethnicity on voting patterns is not completely stable across states. 
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Where does this leave us? I think with two conclusions, both of which reiterate the 
paper’s main claims. First, explanation does require empirical success, but this success 
can sometimes take the form of retrospective accommodations as well as future 
predictions. Once ‘prediction’ is interpreted broadly in this way, Slot 3 remains empty. 
The second conclusion is methodological: an emphasis on the development of theories 
and mechanisms is often a poor way to achieve this empirical success. In such cases, 
purely predictive models are best, although sometimes case-specific historical 
explanations might also be available. That said, in other cases theory may obtain 
sufficient empirical success to warrant explanations or at least partial explanations after 
all – one example is demographic analysis of elections. Still, even then they only do so 
thanks to empirical success, in other words Slot 3 again remains empty. 
 
 
8. Coda: in further defense of prediction 
Sometimes there may even be scope for moving from Slot 2 to Slot 1, i.e. for a purely 
predictive model also to generate explanations. At the end of section 6, I mentioned a 
couple of examples of this in the weather forecasting case, or at least of tentative steps in 
that direction. If the quantity of data is high, then it is more possible to run natural 
experiments in order to test non-holistically the impact of particular parts of a model. In 
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such cases we may indeed acquire warrant for certain causal – and thus explanatory – 
claims, and we would be moving into Slot 1. 
 
Being in Slot 1, such causal inference would be Galilean in nature – as it were, the 
predictive model would no longer be purely predictive. But the point is the route by 
which Slot 1 is reached. It is only by an initial methodological prioritization of prediction 
that sufficient empirical success is achieved to enable the subsequent generation also of 
explanations. To go for explanation straightaway, by sticking to a model with 
well-known mechanistic operation even in the face of predictive shortfall, would be 
exactly the wrong path, analogous to the case of the fundamentals models in election 
prediction. We need to be prepared to depart from established theory in the service of 
prediction as ultimately this turns out to be the only hope in these cases also of achieving 
explanation too. 
 
Such a methodological approach reflects the heuristic view of models mentioned in 
section 2, according to which theory alone should not be seen as providing models that 
can be confirmed and generate explanations. Instead, the role of theory is merely to 
suggest inputs for the extra-theoretical – usually empirical and case-specific – work 
needed to generate eventual causal hypotheses. Accordingly, the initial theoretical models 
themselves are not explanatory; rather, what might be explanatory are the independent 
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extra-theoretical ‘models’ that eventually result (Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and 
Northcott 2009). Weather forecasting is a fine example of this.
31
 
 
There are also two additional senses in which even purely predictive models can 
sometimes do more than merely predict. The first is that they often license successful 
interventions – and thus causal knowledge of a kind. One example of this is the many 
instances of chemotherapy where the mechanism is unknown but the efficacy is well 
established. Another example, already mentioned, is economic auctions, and in particular 
the well-studied case of government-run spectrum auctions (Guala 2005, Alexandrova 
2008), where the success of the auction design is well established even though the 
holistic nature of the pre-testing required to generate that design means we have no 
detailed mechanistic explanation of the auctioneers’ success. 
 
True enough, in both the chemotherapy and auction cases extrapolation of the models to 
new applications is sadly difficult, requiring much fresh laborious work each time 
(Alexandrova and Northcott 2009). This is the disadvantage of being in Slot 2 rather than 
Slot 1: the predictive success is not easily generalizable. Nevertheless, especially in the 
                                                 
31
 Some, such as Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), see even heuristic models as indirectly explanatory to a 
degree. Perhaps. But regardless of one’s preferred semantics of ‘explanatory’, the key point of difference 
here remains, since Kuorikoski & Ylikoski still support a methodological emphasis on explanation over 
prediction. 
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auctions case, predictive success in one application has enabled success in some new 
applications to come at least a little more easily. 
 
Indeed, a similar story applies in the election case too: the polling aggregators’ success in 
one election did generalize to other elections – to some degree. Admittedly though, the 
case-specific nature of polling aggregation means that a serious aggregator must build a 
new election prediction model each time, and as a result, although sometimes the 
aggregators were again successful, the first success did not guarantee the second 
(Northcott 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, overall the point is that sometimes some of the benefits of Slot 1 can be 
achieved, albeit imperfectly and more laboriously, by going via Slot 2: in the case of 
weather forecasting some degree of explanation, and in the other cases some degree of 
generalizability. The common feature is that such benefits as do accrue rest crucially on 
predictive success. This remains the foundation for everything else. For this reason, 
reaching Slot 1 via Slot 2 remains superior to doomed attempts to progress via Slot 3. In 
other words, when our models are not predictively accurate, just refining those models 
according to theoretical criteria is an unpromising strategy. In these cases, progress can 
only be made by the hard empirical work of improving predictions instead. That is when 
purely predictive models are best.  
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